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MONETARY AIID BAI{KING POLICIES
IN THE 1995 FEDERAL GO\TERNMENT BUDGET*
BaDr.M,O.OJo,WecWoJkxarch,@ntalfurtkoJNlgerlo
INTRODUCTION

source use in the economY
througfr the mobilDation and
speciflcaUon of a programme of allocation of flnancial reflscal operatlons durln$a given sources. As ecpected, monetary
flscal year. Such a prograrnme poltcy is a cornerstone of the
has a profound tmpact on the Federal Government Budget for
economy, relleeUng the stze and f995. The matn obJective in
paper is to ouflihe and
structure of revenues flnd.Flr:
the monetarY
analyse
penditures, as well as the
prograrnme
which forms Part
magnitude and fbeanclng of the

fflhe central feature of a govL ernment budget ls the

budget deflcit. Fiscal operations
are olten used explicitly to influence the level and groMh of
economic activity, the allocaUon of resources between differentuses and the distributlon
of tncome. However, govern-

ment flscal operations usually
lnduce a rapld gowth ln aggregate demand which has
adverse consequences on domestic prices and the balance
of payments posiUon. As a result, the fiscal programme in
the budget is usually suPPorted

of the macroeconornie Poliry

framework of the Budget. An
attempt will be made to orPlain

the background to

the

progranrme framework, how it
is orpected to oPerate and the
likely future poliry direction.
Followtng this introduction, we
shall review the recent exPerience in monetary management,
outline the monetary PolicY
measures in the Budget and
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reflationary package was introduced to stem the sagging
morale of the populace after
two years of austerity measures.
In tlee twoyears preceding I 988,
the stance of rnonetary PolicY

had been tight as required
explaln the modalities for under the adjustment
achieving the monetary PolicY programme. Ivlonetarv and
objecUves. In the conclusion, credit expansion was modest

we shall touch on the factors while the average inflation rate
(see
policy such as monetary and that are considered critical for was under 10 per cent
rethe
Following
l-Si.
the success of the monetarY Tables
exdrange rate poltcies.
flation package in 1988, monThefocus of this PaPer is on programme in 1995.
etary growth became excessive.
the role of monetary PolicY in
With the excepUon of I 989, the
thebudget. EssentiallY, the aim RECENT EXPERIENCE IN
growth of broad money (M2)
of monetary policY is to ensure MONDTARY MANAGEMENT
was above 30 per cent in each
that the expansion in domestic
It is instructive to discuss year up to 1993. In 1993, there
Itquidtty during a flscal Year is
increase in
consistent with ttre targets for briefly our recent exPerience in was indeed a record
per
In 1994,
cent.
growth, tnflation and the bal- monetary management in order M2 of 52.8
is
ance of payrnents. To achieve to appreciate the expectations the increase in M2 estimated
per
cent. The
32
programme
be
about
to
this broad goal, monetary PolicY from the monetary
1988 has
growth
in
M2
since
ln a budget attemPts to stabi- in 1995. The most aPProPriate
a reflection of the
lizr the economy, as well as starting point of such a review largely beenin
narrow money
movement
lnfluence the efficiencY of re- is 1988 when the so-called

by other tools of macroeconomic
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'APaper presenteddtt*tg tle fulicy Sem{nar on the 7995 Fderol(NCEII4N and Ntgerion bonomic Socbtu {NES) at the Ntgerian
Admbalstratlon
o;yj
lvlanogemert
ICBM, No.fronrrl @ntteJor fuorrrmic
I nsttfrtte o.f lntemotlonal Atfairs, Virtofia I slan4 Februarg 1, 1 I I 5

I6

Volume 19 No.

(Ml), the target variable. The
gfowth of Ml ranged between a
low of 2I.2 per cent in 1989
and a peak of 66.4 per cent in
1992. During the six years
endlng in 1993, Ml grew at an

of credit ceillngs on banks to
check the excesslve grolvth of
domesuc liquidity, but, as it ts
well-known, this monetary
policy instrument had become

annual average of 43.7 per cent
compared wtth the target of
16.9 per cent a year. In 1994,
preliminary estimates show
that the increase in MI was
39.2 per cent whlch was almost
double the target rate of 21.4
per cent. The major factor in
the rapid monetary expanslon
since 1988 has been the excessive growth in aggregate
domestic credit. It grew excessively in 1988 and 1991-1994
when it recorded an average
lncrease of 49.9 per cent compared with the target rate of
11.8 per cent. The upsurge in
credit to the economy in recent
years has been due largely to
the rapid increases in govern-

gradual abroga0on began on
lst September, 1992. The authoriues tried another instrument - issue of stabilization
securitles - which, as will be
discussed later, has not been
an tdeal tool in the edsung
environment. The CBN flnally were largely influenced by the
moved to the modest applica- increasing level
of
tion of Open Market Operations macroeconomic instability and
(OMO) from June 30, 1993.
distortions. In 1989, following
The CBN's experience in the the withdrawal of public sector
conduct of OMO in 1993 to deposits from the banks to the
manage domestic liquidity was CBN, there emerged a relative
a useful one in-splte of the sca-rclty offunds which induced
prevailing economic turbu- dramatic increases in interest
lence. The banks responded rates. Maximum lending rates
adequately to CBN's offerings moved above the 3O per cent
partly because of the contrac- level. The high rates persisted
tion in the volume of activities until 1993 with an interruption
in the inter-benk funds market in 1991 when an upper limit of
and partly because of the sys- 21 per cent was imposed on
tem of foreign o<change allo- lending rates by the a u thori ti es.
cation which encouraged banks As the actions to control interest
to accumulate high levels of rates in I991 were largely unliquidity in short-dated Trea- successful. the interest rate
sury Bills to back up their de- regime was again deregulated
mand for foreign exchange. But in 1992 and 1993 when rna,Kiof greater signilicance was t1.e mum lending rates climbed to
relatively attractive yields on about 40-60 per cent. Interthe securities. In 1994, how- bank funds rates climbed to
ever, the pegged interest rate over 120 per cent. These high
regime constrained the conduct rates induced the reimposition
of OMO and the weekly primary of controls in 1994.
As indicated earlier,
Treasury Bill auction, resulting
distortions and
macroeconornlc
tn the failure to sell the appropriate amounts of the Bills to the response of the authorities
drain the excess liquidity in the to these distortions helped to
sustain the high levels of intersystem.
One consequence of the est rates since 1987. Arnong
disequilibrium in the monetary the factors involved were:
sector has been the high vola- (i) the crowding out of the
private sector in credit altility in interest rate movelocation arising frorn lhe
ments. Interest rates moved
huge government delicits
upwards under the influence of
in
financed largely by the
first
was
several shocks. The

ment borrowing from the
banking system. Of the total
increase ln credit to the
economy in recent years, the
government sector had absorbed not less than 75 per
cent. As a consequence, credit
to the government sector had
more often orceeded the targets

by wide margins. The bulk of
the credit to the govemment
sector was exftended by the CBN
which on the average accounted

for roughly 80 per cent oftotal
credit to the govemment. Bank
credit to the private sector had
also gpown signiflcanfly, butby
lesser rnagnitudes. Even then,
this could be linked with the
o(cessive govemment spending
whidr had enhanced the growth
of bank deposits and reserye
balances.

The monetary authorities
had, for the greater part of the
period, relied on the lmPosition
17
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virtually irrelevant and its

1987 when all interest rates
were deregulated. The rates
which tritherto were administratively ftxed moved up voluntarily, but the resultant interest rate levels were still
relatively low and generally
positive in real terms.
Expectedly, the deregulation of
interest rates engendered
competition among banks to
attract deposils. Subsequent
movements in interest rates

Voflrn

(ltl

19
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Uanktng rystem;
Bre use ofstab[lzadonsccurtfles to mop up erqass

llqutdlty;
0U) the lncrease ln the num-

ber of lnsolvent banks

anoe of payments pcluon detertorated further.
On the whole" nnonetary
managernent has been a nlghtmare for the rnoneta4r authorlfles slnce 1988. Mmt, of the
tlme, tntermediate rnonetary
and ultimate obJectives could

whleh engaged tn dlstress
borrowing to stay alloat;
(tvl the skewed drstrlbuUon of not be attalned. Monetary
bank resenes and the re- management was to mnqre to
luctance of ltqutd banlcs to the market-based appreiach
lend tobanks wtth doubt- whose lmplernentation was
ful credtt rattng;
systemattcally phased out.
(v) the large lncidence of Howerrer, the apparent tnstaarbltraging, resultlng in btlity and frequent policy relayers of lnterest rate versals constrained slgnlflcant
progress in that directlon as an
spreads: and
(vi) the foretgn exchangemar- unusually large burden was
ket arrangement which trnposed on monetary control
encouraged the t5ringup of to achieve below rnarket lnfunds for market transac- dicative targets. The economic
environrnentat the end of 1994
tions.
The overall effects of fiscal has, thus, made the demand
imbalances, high monetary on monetary management in
expansion and volatile interest 1995 rather stringent. Arnong
rate movements on the real other things, rnonetary and
sectors were unsatisfactory. banking policies in 1995
The inereasing ratio of liscal should:
delicit to GDP tnitiated the (i) reduce drasUcally tlte excess liquidlty in t}:e sysdistorUons since f988. The
tem:
rising fldng dellclt was fl nanced
(ii)
prwenttheemergenceof-a
which
money
by higlr-powered
new round, of orcess liinduced rapid monetary exquidity;
pansion. This was a source of
(iii)
pressures
reduce drasUcally the rate
high inflationary
of inflation to a rnore acduring the period. The persisceptable level;
tent er<change rate depreciation
which emanated from the htgh (iv) reduce pressures on the
o<ternal sector generally;
monetary erpansion, as well as
and
high levels of interest rates were
other sources of inflationary (v) maintain a stable and acpressures. Under these condiceptable exchange rate regime.
Uons, real economic indicators
werebelowtargets and failed to
engender the stabllity needed TTTE MONETARY
for sustalnable growth. For ln- PROGRAMME T'OR 1995
stance, the growth of domestic
The monetary prograrnme
outputbegan to decline rapidly
after f99O under the adverse for 1995 is based on an alterlnfluence of excessive demand native that is less than ideal,
pressures. These affected also but much better than the conthe external sector as the bal- tinuation of the unsatisfactory
t8

sltuaHon of 1994. The ideal
monetary programrne would
have been btltlt on assinmptions sucke as a rate of irrflation
that is below 5 per cent, a bdaneed burdget and a growth, rate
above 5 per cesrt. Given the
poor state of the economy in
t}re past several years" this
wor.rld be unrealisable in the
immediate futtrre. [t is consiclered nnore realistic to build the
programme on the follourlng
assumptions: an lnflaUon rate
of 15 per cent, a growth rate of
at least 3 per cent and a modest
accretion to external reserves.

Thts aiternafive assumes that
the undesirable trends ofrecent
years wouid be gradually reversed through the implernentaUon of relevarrt policy measures. Foilowing from the choice

of this option, the targets of
rnonetary poliqr in 1995 tnclude:

{i) an increase in

narrow

of 1O.0 per
cent;
anincreaseinbroadrnoney
ituI2) of I"O.4 per cent;
an increase in aggregate

rnoney (IvIl)

(ii]
{iiii

domesUc credit. (net) of 16.2

per cent;

(iv) an increase in credit to tl:e

M

private sector of 20.0 per
cerrt; and
an increase in credit (net)
to govemment of 14.2 per

eent.
Tc achiesetliese targets, the
CEN will, as in 1994, use as its

main instrument the conduct
of open market operations tc
be coordinated with discount
window and reserve requirernent policies. As wiil be explained later, the use of stabilization securities will continue
although the instrument is stiil
regarded as a temporaryone by
the rnonetary authori ties. Other
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lnstruments of monetary policy
ln 1995 are:
(l) amoreflerdbleinterestrate
poltcy which allows finarrclal institutlons to main-

Ltqutdtty Overhang
; troversies as to the appropriAs indicated earlier, as a I ateness of this instrument. In-

result of the expansionary poli- deed, the CBN had suspended
ciespgf the last few years, an the active use of the lnstruo(cess liquidity now exits in ment since March 1993 ln
taln only a maximum the economy. To start off the readiness for the introduction
spread of 7t/, percentage flscal year without further in- of OMO and the recognitton of
potnts between their de- creasing inflattonary erpecta- Its adverse stde effects. The
poslt and lendtng rates tlons and particularly to sup- phased repa)rnent of ttre outsubJect to a maximum port the new foreign exchange standing stabiltzation securiHes
lendtng rate of21 per cent; market mechanism, there is which have beerr rolled over at
(tl) the continuaflon of efforts need to reduce thts llquidfty maturtty was to be considered
to deal with defaults and overhang to the barest mini- ln 1994, but the problem of
distress in the flnancial mum level possible. The hub of excessivq domestic liquldity
system;
the new occhange rate reglme throughout the liscal year pre(iii) the continued use of credit is the autonomous lnter-bank vented action in that regard.
ceilings for banks which foreign exchange market (IFEM) The intended phased repaydo not meet the criteria which is tobe the marketforall ment of the securities outspecified since 1992; and transactions o(cept those of standing will continue to be
(lv) the continuation of the selected goverrrment transac- kep[ in view ln the liglrt of desectoral allocailon of credit. tions. The exchange rate ln the velopments in the system's liMost other monetary poliry IFEM ls to be determined by quidity during 1995. The CBN
measures in force in l9g4 are market fiactors. The CBN is, has, however, continued to pay
also retained in 1995 as out- however, to intervene in the appropriate interest rates on
lined in Monetary Policy Circu- market with the aim of achieV: the outstanding securities. The
lar No. 29.
ing an occhange rate whtch ls issue of stabilisation securities
considered realistic in the light is very effective in sterilizing
I
oPERATIONAT. MODALITIES of the prevatling market fun- rbanks' excess reserves, but
FOR MONETARY AND
damentals. Initially, the aim : banks don't favourtthe instruBANKING POLICIES
will be to prevent a precipitous , mentfor the followtngreasons:
depreciation of tl:e naira ex- (i) Stabilisationsecuritiesare
After the review of the back- change rate in the IFEM vis-atlliquid, unmarketable
glround to the presentsituation vis the official rate through
among banks and

of excess liqutdity in

the demand management and

economy and the ocpectations
from the monetary prograrnme
in 1995, as well as the analysis
of the thrust, direction of the
targets and the instruments of
the prograrrune, what remains

supply-side initiatives. tt is clear
that the CBN will, at this point,
not be able to intervene very
effectively on the supply side

because of the prevailing
shortage of foreign exchange.
is to articulate ttre modalities Much will depend on effective
for ensuring that the various demand management by the
monetary targets are achieved.
In this regard, we shall touch
on four main activity areas for

the monetary authorities:

deallngwith the liquidity over-

hang, day-to-day liquidity

management, interest rate
tnanagement and dealing with
flnanctal dlstress.
l9

undiscountable

1

(ii)

at the

CBN;
New issues tend to desta-

bilize banks' portfolios:

(iii) The liquidity shocks pro-

duced by the issue of stabilization securiUes cause
distortions in the interest
rate sti.ucture and interCBN. The monetary prograrnme
bank operations; and
for 1995 has thus taken action (iv) The allocation of the secuto reduce tJre liquidity overhhng
rities tobanks on thebasis
through the issue of stabilizaof their liquidity positions
tion securities of NlO billion.
may be inequitable and
This will be in addition to the
could create liquidity criconUnuing roll over of the exsis for borderline banks.
isting stock of about N25 billion.
The CBN itself has notbeen
This latest acUon of the CEN
has no doubt renewed the con-

comfortable rrt i ] I ll ;,. r : :e of th t
instrument. f lor'.'.-'.'i, it shoul.i

Volumo 19 No.
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known that many cen- a weekly basls. Thls will contral banks, tncludtng those of tinue ln 1995 and will be condeveloped countries apply the ducted largely ln govemment
same instrument ln various securities a large proportion of
guises or at least reserve its use which is held by the CBN. OMO
for emergency purposes. Per- will be coordinated with dishaps, the challenge posed to count wlndow and reserve rethe CBN tn this regard is how to qulrement pollcies to ensure
make ttre instrument accept- the atlainment of monetary
able t banks while using it to targets. Discount Houses will
achieve the same objective. For also continue to be the main
instance, stabilisation securl- intermed iarles for the conduct
Ues can be tumed lnto a proper of OMO whtle they in turn will
money market instrument with as before engage in secondary

be made

the attributes of statutory liquldity and marketability in
both the primary market and
the inter-bank secondary
market. They could also be
rediscountable or pledgeable for
discount wlndow operatlons.
The issue rate would be at the
discretlon ofthe CBN, attrac ve
and market oriented. These
condiUons would be feasible as
soon as the lnterest rate regime
becomes more approprlate and
sustainable. lf we envisage a
period when treasury securities
will become scarce as flscal
deficits reduce, the development of a CBN instrument. as
this reform points to, will enhance the use of OMO in the
system. However, the appeal of
the CBN is for cooperation to

restore economic stability
whichwill make it unnecessary
to continue to apply the instrumenl in its present form.

I
I

Open market Operatlons
If the liquidity overhang in
the economy can be eliminated
or reduced to the barest minimum as tndicated above, what
is left is to check the unnecessary growth of liquidity in the
course of ttre year. From mid1993, the CBN has applied
OMO as an instrument for
managing domestic liquidity on

20

market dealings with other
dealers in the market.

It may be informauve to explain ln very slmple terms what
the CBN tries to do in the conduct of OMO. OMO by the CBN
involves the buylng and selling
of treasury securities in the
secondary market with a I'iew
to influencing the movement in
bank reserves which would in

turn impact on the

tween the supply and demand
for total bank reserves. If the
difference is positive, that is,
the optimal deryand for reserves
exceeds the observed supply of
reserves, reserves must be inJected into the system by buying securiues. If the difference
is negatve, that is, the observed
supply of reserves exceeds the
optimal demand for reserves,
reserves must be sterilized by
selling securities. As principal

intermediaries through which
the CBN conducts OMO, Discount Houses maintain current
accounts with the CBN through
which their transactions lvith
the CBN are either credited or
debited. Similarly, the banks
keep part of their reserves with
the Discount Houses for the
purpose ofparticipation in CBN

oMo.
It should be observed that

other the CBN has waited patiently
monetary aggregates, especia-lly for an opportunitv to effecuvely
interest rates, domestic credit use OMO to achieve simuitaand the money supply. There neously some intermediate obare three elements in the con- .jectives for stabilizing the
duct of OMO. First is the de- economy. If the situation is
termination of the optimal de- stabie, OMO will tend to
mand for bank reserves for maintain the money stock, inmeeting the cash reserve re- terest rates and exchange rates
quirement, penalty deposits, at sustainable levels that wlll
vault cash and cheque clearing
purposes. This optimal level of
reserves is determined in relation to the broad objectives of
macroeconomic policy as re-

achieve price stability, desirable

output growth and acceptable
balance of payments position.
First and foremost, OMO.
as shown earlier, will alm at
vea-led in the model of demand / influencing reserves in such a
supply for money. Second is way as to maintain the desired
the determination of the supply growth path for the money
of total bank reserves invoh'ing supply. OMO will also attempt
the examination of the CBN to keep short-term interest rates
balance sheet regarding within some desirable band. As
changes in its foreign asset soon as the inter-bank funds
holdings, credit to the govern- market becomes stable, the
ment and private sector and inter-bank rate could be an
other assets (net). Thtrd is the acceptable bench mark for such
determination of the OMO tar- rates and would be approprlate
get which ls the difference be- tf other rates in the system
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move ln close s1rmpathy with lt
aind tf the demand for credit is
responslve to ttre movement in
tnterest rates. Also. OMO wtll

att€rnpt to stabtlize the nalra
octrange rate by ensurtng that
the lQufdity in tJ:e economy is
brought to a level compattble
with the equtlibrium exchange
rate. Ofcourse, the equiltbrtum
o<change rate is one that ls
also compauble wlth a certaln
level of fnflation, output and
external reseryes. To sustain
the equilibrium exchange rate,
the monetaqr authortues will
also undertake sales and purchases of foreign exchange in
the foreign o<change market.
Ultimately, the efhcacy of
OMO tn the control of liquidity

ensuing hikes tn lntsest rates,
there wasJustillcatlon for some

stability as underlined by the
ftscal and monetary
kind of interventlon to programmes in the 1995 Budnorrnallse the tnterest fate get. In parucular, there ls need
structure ln 1994. In the event, to:
however, the monetary au- (t) effecttvely control the
thorlfles er.perienced difflculfl es
growth of domesUc liqutdimplementlng the adminlstraIty to bring down the rate
Hvely llxed interest rate regtme.
of inflation;
The private sector demand for (il) reduce the banklng
credlt became excessive and in
system's flnanclng of the
comblnation with the overflscal deflcit to prerrent the
valued exchange rate lncreased
crowing out of the priyate
the demand for foreign exsector;

change. Underlying pressures
on the already weak balance of
payments posiUon also intensifled. Furthermore, the pegging
of the treasury bills issue rate
made it difficult for the CBN to
effecUvely apply OMO, which
tn I 995 would depend to a large was supposed to be the maJor
ortent on the success of inter- instrument of monetary manest rate management. The need agement.
to avoid an abrupt deregulation
In consequence, one option
of interest rates as in the past for interest rate management
and as implied in the Budget in 1995 would have been to
would suggest that the demand allow lnterest rates to be fully
for credit would remain strong market-determined. If this had
for the flrst few months of t]"e been done ln the midst of the
flscal year, especla[y to cover distortions that induced the
the larger naira 4mounts substantial increases ln interneeded to purchase the appre- est rates observed in 1992 and
ctated foretgr currencies. The 1993, another round of insltuaton would change lf flscal creases in the rate would
and monetar;r conditions per- probably take place with all the
rnit the interest rate reglme to adverse effects. With the expebe sustainable and in alignment rience of hindstght, the choice
wtth developments in the for- of the interest rate poltcy for
eign exchange market which 1995 based on the fixing of a
could then witrress an appre- madmum lending rate and
ciating naira exchange rate. All speciflcation of a ma.rdmum
these revolve around comrdt- spread between the madmum
ment to macroeconorric sta- lending rate and deposit rate is
predicated on the need to free
bility.
interest rates gradually pendIrterest Rate Ma[agieEcnt. ing the emergence of the necGovemment faced a diflicult essary condiflons for total decholce regarding the direction regulauon. However, to sustain
of interest rate policy in 1995. the policy directlon for 1995,
With the macroeconomic dis- concerted efforts should be
tortions h f 992,/f 993 and the made to restore macroeconornic
2l

]

(iii)

revieu/ developments so as

to achleve

greater

s1mchronisa on between
interest and exchange
rates; and
(M apply moral suasion, effecuve monltortng and appropriate penalties fornoncompliance wtth guldelines.
In the medium to long-term.

the monetary authoritles

should adopt a d5mamic approach to lnterest rate management. As the flnancial
markets are likely to be imperfect for someUme to come
and glven also the lmportant
role ofinterest rates ln tncreaslng savings and lnvestment we

should get used to the idea of
some minirnum intervenuon to
influence lnterest rate movements. But the alm will be to
progressively deregulate inter-

est rate determination.

One
approach that was adopted by
the CBN in the past ts to speciry
a madmum spread between
the average cost of funds to a

bank and tts lending rate,

leaving tt to determine the levels of other rates in the structure. This approach is largely
market-related, but tt may be
dtfficult to monitor as the operators may llnd it dilncult to
calculate the costs of funds asi

January/March 1995
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Shilarly, theCBN has conrequfid. In the flnal analysis
when optimum conditions tinued to study the peculiar
prcx/atl tn the economy and ttre
Iinancial markets in particular,

t]le most acceptable approach
is to apply relevant monetary
poltcyinstruments to influence
irrterest rates indirectly. As indtcated earlier, since the int€rest rate is an important intermediate variable which affects savings and investment,
it should, as much as possible
be free of encumbrances.

Checttng Flnanclal Sector
Dlstress
The issue of financial sector

distress has become rather
delicate. But it is clear that
dealing with this problem will
contribute immensely to the
success ofmcnetary and bankingpolicies in the 1995 Budget.
One is aware that the CBN and
NDIC take this matter seriously.

Wlth regard-tobanks, the two
ins tutions have determined
the linancial conditon of each
distressed bank and approprtate actions have been agreed
on the modality for dealtngwith
defaults and distress in the
system to enhance general
conffdence. At present, some
proposals by the two instituUons are being considered by
the govemment. Indicative of
the solutions to be considered
I

t

l

by the CBN and NDIC were the
:r.';t.ons taken in 1994 which
ircluded take over, restructuring and outright liquidation of
.rr"rninally distressed banks.
F{ecently, the issue ofsancuons
against directors, ollicers and
borrowers whose actions resulted in the plight of banks
had been addressed in a new
decree whose provisions will be

resolutely implemented in
1995.

72

loss account for the year
before any appropriatlon
ls made to statutory reserves, dividends for share
bonus lssue.

problems of the flnance companies and taken some actions
pending the finalisation of the
deslgn of a comprehensive
framework for more effective CONCLUSION
supervision and opflmal resoThe paper has discussed the
lution of the problems of dlstressed Iinance companies This role of monetary and banking
framework is to be applied in policies in the achievement of
1995. It may be of interest to the objectives of the 1995
note that the number of finance Federal Govemrnent Budget.
companies declined from 752 0n thebasis of the obJectives of
in 1993 to722in 1994. During the Budget and recent experience in monetary management,
I 994, t I linance companies
had their licences revoked while the expectations from the
l l had their Approvals in monetary programme for 1995
Principle cancelled. Conse- are rather stringent and include
quently, there are now 29I fi- the elimination of excess linance companies with full li- quidity and effective control of
cences and 431 with APProvals domesuc liquidity so as to rein Principle. In December 1994, duce the inflation rate signilithe CBN made some amend- cantly and the pressures on
ments to the revised guidelines the extemal sector to engender
for finance companles. These exchange rate stability. The
monetary policy lneasures and
were:
(a) the reductlon, with effect their modalities were also exfromJanuary l, 195 of the amined.
The monetary programme
Minimum Borrowing Limit
for finance companies from for 1995 is relatively more
N100,0O0.00 to grounded than ln 1994 and
can effectively support the
N50,000.00; and
(b) the granting of forbea-rance Budget. However, the fiscal
to linance companies in programme should also be a
the implementation of the support to the monetary
Prudential Guidelines. Fi- programme with particular renance companies are now gard to ensuring that the Fedgranted a four-year period eral Government borrowing
to write-off shortfalls in requirement from the banking
provisioning for risk as- system is strictly adhered to.
sets, subject to the condi- The capability of the Federal
tions that (i) accumulated Govemment to implement the
monetary
under-provising as at De- fiscal and
cember 3f, 1994 shall be programmes appears greater,
amortised over a maximum but effective monltoring is
period of 4 years and (ii) necessary to allow for appropro-rated accumulated priate flne-tunlng in the course
shortfalls rn provisioning of the fiscal year.
shall be charged together
with the current year's
provisions to the profit and
.
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TABLE 2
SELDCTED INTEREST RATES (END -DECEMBER)
(PERCENT}

1984

t985

1986

1987

1988

l/

1989

1990

l9sl

1992

1993 r*421

Tlcasury Bllb lssuc Rate

6.5

E.5

8.5

1l .8

u.8

16.4

17.5

14.5

2t.o

28.0
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9.0
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t2.5
l3,o

9.5

9.5
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9.5
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TABIE 3
MACR,OEC.ONOMIC IIiIDICATORS

(PERCENTI
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